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The current state of federal securities law poses many issues for small businesses aspiring to raise capital
through the assistance of a broker. A literal reading of section 15(a)(1) would seem to require all brokers to
register as broker-dealers, even if they only engage in a single transaction. Recognizing that the burdens
imposed on registered broker-dealers make this regulatory framework highly undesirable, the SEC and the
courts have diverged from a literal reading of the act. Courts apply a multifactor test to determine if brokers
must register as broker-dealers, and the SEC tends to focus on specific factors, often declaring that the receipt
of transaction-based compensation is in itself sufficient to require registration. Recognizing that the regulatory
framework in place prevents the capital financing of many small businesses, the SEC revised its enforcement
policy by stating in a no-action letter that it would not recommend enforcement against an M&A broker who
transferred control of a business in a private transaction, subject to many limiting conditions. While providing
some relief, this no-action letter is insufficient to ameliorate the tension between the actual practices of
brokers and the law as it stands. As a result, a significant portion of the private equity market is still in flux. The
legislative solution proposed by this note is a viable path to ensuring the continued growth of American small
businesses while maintaining the integrity of markets and protection of investors.
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Broker-Dealer Law Reform
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN A STATE OF
LIMBO
INTRODUCTION
Prior to 2012, Neogenix Oncology, Inc. was a prospering
biotechnology company with more than 500 shareholders and
significant clinical developments in the field of cancer treatment.
In order to boost share prices, the company’s CFO paid
unregistered financial intermediaries to sell Neogenix stock to
investors.1 Following the stock sales, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) launched an inquiry into the legality of the
transactions that hinged on whether the financial intermediaries
who pushed the stock were in fact required to be registered as
broker-dealers.2 Pursuant to section 78o(a)(1) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, which requires financial intermediaries who sell
securities to register with the SEC, the SEC found that the sales
by the unregistered intermediaries were illegal and voidable.3
Since the securities transactions were voidable, Neogenix was
unable to complete its financial statements to the satisfaction of
its outside auditors.4 Consequently, Neogenix was unable to
continue raising capital.5 The company entered bankruptcy in
July 2012 and was forced to sell all of its assets to a single bidder.6
The story of Neogenix’s rise and fall exemplifies a recurring trend
in the murky field of small-issuer finance. When unregistered
financial intermediaries facilitate the sale of securities to
investors, companies face potential rescission of transactions, loss
1 See Amy Natterson Kroll et al., Neogenix—A Cautionary Tale, LAW360
(Sept. 13, 2012, 7:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/378306/neogenix-a-cautionarytale?article_related_content=1 [http://perma.cc/W59M-WENZ].
2 See Letter from Philip M. Arlen, President and CEO, Neogenix Oncology,
to Neogenix Oncology Shareholders (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1341293/000114420412001993/v245246_ex99-1.htm [http://perma.cc/52Z2-3FPK]
[hereinafter Neogenix Letter].
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See In re Neogenix Oncology, Inc., No. 12-23557-TJC, 2015 WL 5786345, at *2
(Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 1, 2015).
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of securities offering exemptions, and criminal liability.7 These
consequences may deal a death blow to companies, like Neogenix,
that are seeking investment to grow and succeed.
Raising capital is critical for startup companies and
established corporations alike.8 It is an essential aspect of
starting a business, because “[c]apital is the lifeblood of a
growing business.”9 Small businesses account for 99.7% of all
employer firms; thus, if startups cannot grow, the economy of
the United States cannot grow.10 Raising capital is an
important prerequisite for talent acquisition, manufacturing,
marketing, and expanding operations. Funding for early-stage
companies is often sought in relatively small amounts and is
typically supplied by angel investors.11 Successful fundraising
requires a skill set that many entrepreneurs do not possess;
thus, when entrepreneurs need early-stage financing, they will
often hire a “finder”—an individual who does possess such
skills.12 The purpose of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act was
predominantly to protect investors by imposing registration
requirements on securities and the financial intermediaries
that market those securities to investors.13 To this end, the
SEC obliges financial intermediaries, which help to locate
investors and facilitate transactions, to register as brokerdealers.14 Under current SEC regulations, many of the
See infra Section II.B.
Daniel H. Peters, Finders Can Put the Brakes on Capital Raising, LAW 360
(July 15, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/557676/finders-can-put-the-brakes-oncapital-raising?article_related_content=1 [http://perma.cc/WL28-YRUB].
9 ANDREW J. SHERMAN, RAISING CAPITAL 1 (3d ed. 2012).
10 Id. at 2.
11 An “angel investor” is generally an affluent individual who provides startup
equity for a business, typically in return for convertible debt or equity. GREGORY C. YADLEY,
ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALL AND EMERGING BUS., SEC, “NOTABLE BY THEIR ABSENCE:
FINDERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION” 1
(2015), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/finders-and-other-financial-intermediariesyadley.pdf [http://perma.cc/G3HA-PG2Z].
12 See Jim Casparie, Choosing a Finder When Raising Capital, ENTREPRENEUR
(May 16, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/77838 [http://perma.cc/H3YF-QUYG];
see also Peters, supra note 8 (explaining that founders of companies often enlist
intermediaries to find investors, frequently by providing compensation in proportion to
the amount of equity transferred in the transaction).
13 See S. REP. No. 792, at 1-5 (1934).
14 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC (June 1, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml [http://perma.cc/QC4H-UAP5]; see also Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012). Section 78c(a)(4)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act defines a
“broker” broadly as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A). Section 78c(a)(5)(A) of the
Securities Exchange Act defines a “dealer” as “any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.” Id.
§ 78c(a)(5)(A). The definition of “dealer” does not include a “trader,” that is, a person who
7
8
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individuals who introduce entrepreneurs to investors run the
risk of civil or even criminal liability if they do not register as
broker-dealers with the SEC.15 Despite the risk of such
consequences, many individuals continue to act as unlicensed
broker-dealers due to market demand.16
Few registered broker-dealers are willing to facilitate
transactions worth less than $25 million.17 The costs of
transacting for smaller issuers are potentially even higher than
they are for larger issuers because larger issuers are more
experienced with such transactions.18 The financial information
and internal recordkeeping systems for larger issuers are often
more sophisticated than for smaller issuers.19 Thus, smaller
issuers turn to unregistered brokers and risk serious
consequences if the SEC later determines that the broker
should have been registered.20
The consequences for unregistered financial intermediaries
and issuers include purchasers’ legal rights to rescind
transactions, the loss of a registration exemption from the
Securities Act of 1933, the loss of the legal ability to engage in
private placement offerings,21 and in some cases, criminal
prosecution.22 The SEC changes its interpretation of the brokerdealer rules quite frequently, with the most recent iteration in
the form of a no-action letter purporting to allow unregistered
financial intermediaries to engage in transactions limited to
transferring control of a closely held corporation, as long as they
do not possess securities during the consummation of the
buys and sells securities for his or her own account, either individually or in a fiduciary
capacity, but not as part of a regular business. Individuals who buy and sell securities for
themselves are generally considered traders and not dealers. Any financial intermediary
classified as a “broker” or “dealer” under the aforementioned provisions must register as a
broker-dealer with the SEC.
15 See Compliance Guide to the Registration and Regulation of Brokers and
Dealers: Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC (July 29, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/divis
ions/marketreg/bdguide.htm [http://perma.cc/3A37-9NLD] [hereinafter Compliance Guide].
16 See Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, ABA Section of Bus.
& Law, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Private Placement BrokerDealers, 60 BUS. LAW. 959, 968-69 (2005) [hereinafter ABA Report].
17 See id. at 968.
18 Larger issuers are more experienced with preparing private placement
memorandums for their offerings and are more likely to have complete and accurate
financial information. See id. at 968-69.
19 See YADLEY, supra note 11, at 3.
20 See infra Section III.B.
21 A private placement is an offering to a relatively small group of investors
in reliance on an SEC exemption from securities registration. See, e.g., Offering,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012); see supra note 15;
see also infra Section II.B (explaining the consequences of violating broker-dealer
registration requirements).
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transaction.23 Regardless of SEC interpretations of the Securities
Exchange Act, the market continues to provide incentives for
unregistered broker-dealers to operate because small-scale
issuers need them to raise capital.24
This note proposes a legislative solution that would align
the law with the reality of current early-stage business financing
practices while advancing the core purposes of the broker-dealer
registration requirements and the Securities Exchange Act. This
note argues that a new class of broker-dealers should be created
in order to facilitate transactions with smaller issuers in limited
circumstances. Intermediary brokers for smaller transactions
should have a streamlined registration process, less onerous SEC
and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
requirements, and exemption from registration under state law.
In order to maintain investor protection against fraud and market
manipulation, intermediary brokers registered under this
proposed framework should not be permitted to handle funds or
securities exchanged in the transaction. This legislative solution
would permit transaction-based compensation, as well as the
initiation of negotiations between potential investors and issuers.
Since the functions that many small-issuer broker-dealers
perform are limited to introductions, buyer formation, and
facilitation of negotiations, the current regulations imposing
stringent recordkeeping and financial responsibilities are
unnecessary to ensure that investors are protected.25 This
innovative solution would provide for a secondary marketplace of
financial intermediaries for smaller issuers that cannot yet afford
to hire registered broker-dealers.
Part I of this note explains the ambiguities created by
the broker-dealer rules in the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, federal courts’ limited input on the subject, and the
SEC’s problematic interpretation of the law. Part II explains
why the current framework for broker-dealer registration is an
obstacle to capital acquisition. Part III provides a legislative
solution to the problem. This solution would strike a balance
between protecting investors and issuers and providing a
regulatory framework that would provide a proposed new class
of broker-dealers with sufficient incentives to facilitate smaller
transactions.

23
24
25

See infra Section III.A.
See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 960.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3 to -5, -11 (2013).
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THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: AMBIGUITIES
AND INTERPRETATIONS

Corporate promoters often solicit individuals to help locate
and persuade investors to contribute capital.26 In contemporary
capital markets, an increasing number of companies and funds are
seeking the assistance of intermediaries for the purpose of raising
capital or selling their business.27 A broker is a person who acts as
an intermediary in securities transactions for entrepreneurs.28 A
dealer is any person who buys and sells securities for his or her
own account.29 Broker-dealers may trade securities on their own
account and effect securities transactions for business owners.
When smaller companies desire capital, they often seek out
broker-dealers to assist them in finding investors. Generally,
broker-dealers seek out investors for larger transactions for which
the broker-dealer is well compensated. Concomitantly, “many
broker-dealers will not work with smaller issuers offering a
securities tranche less than twenty-five million dollars in value,
because there is insufficient transaction-based compensation for
the broker-dealer.”30 Therefore, when smaller issuers need capital,
they often seek out unregistered intermediaries for the purpose of
finding investors.31 These unregistered intermediaries are known
as “finders,” and they act as financial intermediaries in
transactions that are not valuable enough to warrant registered
broker-dealer attention. A finder is typically defined as a person,
who brings together buyers and sellers for a fee, but who has no
active role in negotiations, does not hold securities or cash, and
may not bind either party to the transaction.32
In order to become a registered broker-dealer, one must
comply with many comprehensive requirements. The brokerdealer must pass licensing tests administered by the SEC and

26 See Kenneth G.M. Mason & Sharon Obialo, Fog May Be Lifting Around
Finders, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/521047/fogmay-be-lifting-around-finders [http://perma.cc/MNE7-D3B7].
27 See Dario de Martino & Jason Canales, Finders Agreements in a State of Flux,
LAW360 (July 13, 2011, 12:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/257427/findersagreements-in-a-state-of-flux?article_related_content=1 [http://perma.cc/G859-AUFQ].
28 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012).
29 Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
30 See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 969.
31 See Robert Connolly, Legitimizing Private Placement Broker-Dealers Who
Deal with Private Investment Funds: A Proposal for a New Regulatory Regime and a
Limited Exception to Registration, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 703, 704 (2007).
32 See Alan J. Berkeley & Alissa J Altongy, Regulation D Offerings and
Private Placements 51 (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education, 2001). For purposes of
this note, the terms “finders” and “unregistered brokers” will be used interchangeably.
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FINRA.33 Section 78o(a)(1) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
states, in pertinent part,
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person
other than a natural person or a natural person not associated with a
broker or dealer which is a person other than a natural person . . . to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce
the purchase or sale of, any security . . . unless such broker or dealer is
registered in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.34

The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is predominantly to
protect investors against market manipulation by imposing
regular reporting requirements upon securities issuers.35
Registered broker-dealers are required to follow a set of rules
promulgated with the purpose of protecting investors, including
standards of professional conduct, minimum net-capital
requirements, recordkeeping requirements, and supervisory
obligations over broker-dealer employees.36 The registration
requirement aims to guarantee that securities are only sold by an
intermediary who understands and appreciates both the financial
instrument the broker-dealer sells and the broker-dealer’s
responsibilities to investors.37 Registration triggers many other
sections of the Securities Exchange Act, and consequentially,
provides investors with full disclosure regarding securities
offerings, ensures that broker-dealers are competent and
financially able to conduct transactions,38 and subjects brokerdealers to the oversight of self-regulatory organizations.39

33 F. Alec Orudjev, The State of Unregistered Intermediary Regulation, LAW360
(Nov. 17, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/77199/the-state-of-unregisteredintermediary-regulation?article_related_content=1 [http://perma.cc/MTE6-NLLB].
34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2012).
35 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing S. Rep.
NO.792, at 1-5 (1934)).
36 See Roth v. SEC, 22 F.3d 1108, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing David A.
Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899 (1987)).
37 See id.
38 Financial ability is ensured by net capital requirements, which call for a
minimum of net capital and equitable solvency. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1, which states,

For the purposes of this section, a broker or dealer is insolvent if the broker
or dealer: (i) Is the subject of any bankruptcy, equity receivership proceeding
or any other proceeding to reorganize, conserve, or liquidate such broker or
dealer or its property or is applying for the appointment or election of a
receiver, trustee, or liquidator or similar official for such broker or dealer or
its property; (ii) Has made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(iii) Is insolvent within the meaning of section 101 of title 11 of the United
States Code, or is unable to meet its obligations as they mature, and has
made an admission to such effect in writing or in any court or before any
agency of the United States or any State; or (iv) Is unable to make such
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Certain classes of broker-dealers are exempt from the
registration requirement imposed by section 78o(a)(1). Specifically,
broker-dealers who deal only in “exempted securit[ies] or
commercial paper, bankers’ acceptances, or commercial bills” are
not required to register.40 Further, broker-dealers who deal
exclusively in intrastate transactions are not required to register
under the Act, but they may still be subject to state regulation.41
The intrastate exception is interpreted narrowly, in that a
transaction involving the use of interstate communication,
whether by telephone, electronic mail, or another means of
interstate communication, qualifies the transaction as an
interstate one requiring registration with the SEC.42
A.

Determining the Legal Status of Financial Intermediaries

In specific instances, the SEC and the federal courts will
determine whether an unregistered financial intermediary is in
fact acting as a broker-dealer and thus falls under the purview
and registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act.
Section 78o(a)(1) specifies that a person “effecting securities
transactions” using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
must register as a broker-dealer.43 The Act does not, however,
define the meaning of “effecting securities transactions.”44 In
order to determine if a finder must register as a broker-dealer,

computations as may be necessary to establish compliance with this section
or with § 240.15c3-3.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(16) (2014).
39 See David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U.
L. REV. 899, 907 (1987).
40 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2012).
41 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352(2) (McKinney 2015) (“No dealer or broker
shall sell or offer for sale to or purchase or offer to purchase from the public within or from
this state, as principal, or broker, any securities issued or to be issued unless and until a
notice, to be known as the ‘state notice,’ containing the name, business or post office address
of such dealer or broker and if a corporation the state or country of incorporation thereof,
and if a partnership the names of the partners, shall have been filed in the department of
state.”); see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)(A) (making it unlawful for a broker-dealer to “make use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions
in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security”); see also N. Sec.
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8442, at *5 (Mar. 13, 1974) (“We would like to
emphasize that the thrust of the broker dealer registration provisions of Section 15 of the ‘34
Act are to regulate interstate broker dealers, while the ‘33 Act regulates the interstate
offering of securities. . . . The activities of the issuer in this instance are interstate and
rightly come within the provisions of the ‘33 Act.”).
42 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17).
43 Id. § 78o(a)(1).
44 See DeHuff v. Digital Ally, Inc., No. 3:08CV327TSL-JCS, 2009 WL
4908581, at *3 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
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the SEC and federal courts typically apply a multifactor analysis
that considers
whether a person (1) works as an employee of the issuer, (2) receives
a commission rather than a salary, (3) sells or earlier sold the
securities of another issuer, (4) participates in negotiations between
the issuer and an investor, (5) provides either advice or a valuation
as to the merit of an investment, and (6) actively (rather than
passively) finds investors.45

Some courts have postulated that the most important
factor in determining whether an individual is a broker-dealer
is the “regularity of participation in securities transactions at
key points in the chain [of] distribution.”46 For example, in SEC
v. Martino, the court found that a financial intermediary,
Martino, regularly participated in transactions “at key points
in the chain of distribution” when Martino was involved in
every aspect of the securities transactions at issue and was “at
all times aware” of the status of the transactions.47
Consequently, the court found that Martino was acting as an
unlicensed broker-dealer and ordered him to disgorge illegal
brokerage revenues.
The SEC asserts that “[t]ransaction-based compensation,
or commissions[,] are one of the hallmarks of being a brokerdealer” because transaction-based compensation provides “a
potential incentive for abusive sales practices that registration is
intended to regulate and prevent.”48 For example, in the partial
denial of no-action relief49 by the SEC, the issuer, 1st Global,
asked the Division of Market Regulation whether it would
recommend enforcement “if a registered broker-dealer subsidiary
45 SEC v. Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2011); see also
Cornhusker Energy Lexington, LLC v. Prospect St. Ventures, No. 8:04CV586, 2006 WL
2620985, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2006) (identifying activities such as “analyzing the
financial needs of an issuer, recommending or designing financing methods,” discussing
“details of securities transactions,” and recommending an investment as evidence of broker
activity for purposes of triggering the registration requirements); SEC v. Margolin, No. 92
Civ. 6307 (PKL), 1992 WL 279735, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1992) (finding evidence of
“brokerage activity” in the defendant’s “receiving transaction-based compensation,
advertising for clients, and possessing client funds and securities”).
46 See SEC v. Bravata, No. 09-12950, 2009 WL 2245649, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July
27, 2009) (quoting SEC v. Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d 268, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also
Landegger v. Cohen, No. 11-cv-01760-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 5444052, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept.
30, 2013) (finding that two of the factors should be afforded heightened weight: transactionbased compensation and regularity of participation).
47 Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 283; see also SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69
F. Supp. 2d 1, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1998) (describing “regularity of participation” as one of the
primary indicia of “engag[ing] in the business”).
48 Cornhusker Energy Lexington, 2006 WL 2620985, at *6.
49 See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
precedential value of a no-action letter.
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of 1st Global, Inc. enter[ed] into arrangements with certified
public accountants and CPA firms to pay securities-based
commissions.”50 The Division partially denied no-action relief to
1st Global under the arrangement proposed, because
an unregistered CPA firm would indirectly receive securities
commissions earned by a CPA registered representative, thereby giving
it a financial stake in the revenues generated by the registered
representative’s securities transactions, at the same time that the CPA
firm is in a position to influence the registered representative’s actions
and to direct customers to the registered representative.51

The SEC reasoned that intermediaries who receive
transaction-based compensation generally have to register as
broker-dealers because “registration helps to ensure that persons
with a ‘salesman’s stake’ in a securities transaction operate in a
manner consistent with customer protection standards
governing broker-dealers and their associated persons, such
as sales practice rules.”52 Broker-dealer sales-practice rules
require registered brokers to maintain voluminous records of
customer information.53 In addition, broker-dealers must
reasonably believe that an investment strategy is suitable for a
specific investor based on the strategic goals and risk tolerance of
the investor.54 The SEC’s hardline approach to transaction-based
compensation should be contrasted with the approach of the
federal courts, which frequently hold that none of the factors
taken individually are intended to be dispositive of whether an
individual is acting as a broker-dealer.55
Courts and the SEC have disagreed regarding the number
of transactions necessary to establish broker-dealer status.
Moreover, calculating the number of transactions in which a
finder participates becomes an uncertain part of the analysis
because of the ambiguous definition of “participation” in a
transaction.56 The SEC has stated that participation in a
transaction “includes, among other activities, assisting an issuer
to structure prospective securities transactions, helping an issuer
1st Glob., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 499080, at *13 (May 7, 2001).
Id. at *16.
52 See id. at *14.
53 See Books & Records Requirements for Brokers & Dealers Under the Sec.
Exch. Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 44992, 2001 WL 1327088 (Oct. 26, 2001).
54 See OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, SEC, JOINT
SEC/NASD STAFF REPORT ON EXAMINATION FINDINGS REGARDING BROKER-DEALER
SALES OF VARIABLE INSURANCE PRODUCTS 2 (2004), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
secnasdvip.pdf [http://perma.cc/8NXJ-VMYN].
55 See, e.g., SEC v. Benger, 697 F. Supp. 2d 932, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2010); SEC v.
Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
56 See Mason & Obialo, supra note 26.
50

51
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to identify potential purchasers of securities, soliciting securities
transactions (including advertising), and participating in the
order-taking or order-routing process (for example, by taking
transaction orders from customers).”57 For instance, in SEC v.
Margolin, the Court held that the SEC succeeded in
demonstrating “regularity of business activity” because Margolin,
a financial intermediary, had participated “in dozens of
transactions for various clients.”58 Thus, the regularity of business
activity factor is influential but not dispositive in the federal
broker-dealer registration analysis.
B.

Changes in Enforcement Policy by Congress and the SEC

Recognizing that ambiguities in statutory intent and
market realities were making it difficult for smaller issuers to find
investors, and thus to raise capital, Congress and the SEC shifted
their policies to facilitate smaller-issuer capital acquisition. The
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act)
presented a policy change for financial intermediaries assisting
issuers with transactions under Rule 506 of Regulation D.59 Rule
506 permits issuers to sell securities to investors without
registration, provided that issuers comply with conditions
designed to maintain the private nature of the offering.60 The
JOBS Act permits a financial intermediary assisting with a Rule
506 offering not integrated with offerings under any other
exemption to facilitate the transaction, as long as the financial
intermediary does not receive transaction-based compensation.61
Although a step in the right direction, the exemption for Rule 506
transactions is not broad enough to provide a suitable framework
for small-business capital acquisition, especially in light of the
growing use of Title III and Regulation A+ offerings to market
unregistered securities to the investing public.62

57

13, 2000).

MuniAuction, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 291007, at *1 (Mar.

58 SEC v. Margolin, No. 92 Civ. 6307 (PKL), 1992 WL 279735, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 1992).
59 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
60 See id.
61 See id. § 201(c)(2), 126 Stat. at 314.
62 Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies’
Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html
[http://perma.cc/SF6F-DUTY]; Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit
Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html
[http://perma.cc/F3ET-4S8X]. Title III and Regulation A+ permit issuers to market
securities to regular investors, frequently through the use of Internet portals.
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On January 31, 2014, the SEC issued a no-action letter63
stipulating that the SEC would not take enforcement action
against a mergers and acquisitions broker (M&A broker) in
connection with the transfer of a privately held company.64 This
action solidified the notion that financial intermediaries should
not be required to register to engage in the sale of control of a
small issuer. In the no-action letter, the SEC defined an “M&A
broker” as a financial intermediary engaged in the business of
effecting securities transactions solely with the purpose of
transferring ownership and control of a privately-held company
through the sale of securities.65 The SEC emphasized that the
buyer must actually control the company after the sale, and
control may be found through the power to elect executive
officers or the power to approve the annual budget.66 Although it
is risky to treat a no-action letter as legal precedent,67
presumably, the SEC “would not recommend enforcement under
Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act if an M&A broker were to
effect securities transactions in connection with the transfer of
ownership of a privately-held company.”68 There are many limits
on the scope of the protection afforded to M&A brokers by this
letter. Specifically, M&A brokers are prohibited from binding
parties to an M&A transaction, providing financing for a
transaction, handling funds or securities exchanged in
connection with the transaction, organizing the groups involved
in the M&A transaction, or transferring interests to a passive
buyer, among other restrictions.69
The effect of the no-action letter is presumably that the
SEC will not file suit against an M&A broker who engages in
one or more of the following activities70:
1. Represent[ing] the buyer or seller [of securities] . . . as long as both
receive disclosure and give written consent. 2. Facilitat[ing] a
transaction with a buyer or buyer group that, upon completion of the
transaction, will control the business. 3. Facilitat[ing] a transaction
involving the purchase or sale of a privately-held company no matter its
size. 4. Advertis[ing] a company for sale with information such as the
description of the business, general location, and price range. 5. Advis[ing]

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
M&A Brokers, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 356983, at *1 (Jan. 31, 2014).
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
M&A Brokers, 2014 WL 356983, at *1.
See id. at *2-3.
See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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the parties to issue securities or accomplish the transaction by means of
securities, and assess the value of any securities sold.71

Control of the business is presumed to exist if the
purchaser has the power to direct or influence the management of
the acquired company.72 Other conditions sufficient to find control
include ownership of 25% or more of a class of voting securities,
the power to sell 25% or more of a class of voting securities, or in
the case of a partnership or limited liability company, the right to
receive upon dissolution or contribution 25% or more of the
capital.73 Finally, the provisions of the letter prohibit mere
figureheads; the buyer “must actively operate the . . . business
with the assets of the company.”74 Although the M&A broker noaction letter granted some latitude to unregistered financial
intermediaries, many uncertainties remain that threaten to
diminish investment in early-stage companies.
In sum, the currently uncertain regulatory landscape
leaves many gray areas for financial intermediaries and issuers
and threatens to hinder future business investment. It is unclear
how many transactions a broker may engage in without restraint
before broker-dealer registration is required. There is no clear
doctrine regarding the effect of a flat fee that simulates
transaction-based compensation. The M&A no-action letter, by its
plain language, does not apply to transactions in which a large
stake of a company is sold but control is retained, leading to
dissimilar outcomes in nearly identical cases. Regardless of an
uncertain legal landscape, due to market demand and erratic
enforcement policies from the SEC, unregistered brokers continue
to facilitate smaller transactions.75
II.

CURRENT REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS STIFLE
CAPITAL ACQUISITION

In light of the varying interpretations of section 78o(a)(1)
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act by the SEC and various
federal courts, many unregistered brokers are exposed to liability,
and their issuer-principals are exposed to recsissionary liability.
71 Alexander Davie, SEC Provides Exemption from Broker-Dealer Registration
Requirements for M&A Brokers, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM: SEC. (Mar. 11, 2014, 2:22
PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/securities/b/securities/archive/2014/03/11/sec
-provides-exemption-from-broker-dealer-registration-requirements-for-m-amp-a-brokers.
aspx [http://perma.cc/3Z26-KR79].
72 See M&A Brokers, 2014 WL 356983, at *2.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 959.
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The M&A broker no-action letter only applies to transactions in
which the buyer is obtaining control of the business.76 Thus,
smaller businesses that want to raise capital without relinquishing
control to an outsider remain dependent on unregistered brokers,
which are in the gray zone of current regulations. Further, even if
a company is willing to cede control to an outside buyer, the M&A
no-action letter is insufficient to ensure that the SEC will not
bring suit, because no-action letters have no binding precedential
effect, and the SEC has a history of revising its interpretation of
the Securities Exchange Act.77 Violation of the registration
requirements of the Exchange Act may bring deleterious
consequences for brokers and issuers, including voiding the
transaction at issue, losing registration exemption privileges, and
even criminal sanctions. In addition, state securities laws78 are
unnecessarily duplicative and impose additional burdens on
unregistered brokers who attempt to facilitate transactions for
smaller businesses.79
A.

The Implications of the M&A No-Action Letter

The SEC’s position that M&A brokers do not need to
register to conduct a broad range of M&A activities or receive
transaction-based compensation would seem to open up new
opportunities for small-issuer financing.80 The SEC letter,
however, has no precedential effect, and the SEC can revoke it at
any time.81 No-action letters are opinions issued by the staff of the
SEC, not the commissioners.82 As such, no-action letters are not
reviewable “orders” of an agency under the Administrative
Procedure Act.83 The no-action letter is nothing more than a
declaration stating “we won’t sue you this time for this possible
infraction of the law.” It has no binding effect on other parties or
on the same party in subsequent transactions. In practice, many

See M&A Brokers, 2014 WL 356983, at *2-3.
See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
78 State blue sky laws are usually modeled after the Uniform Securities Act of
2002. See MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 2565, 2009 WL 2319599 (2009).
79 See Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue
Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 553 (1985).
80 See Davie, supra note 71.
81 See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254,
257 (2d Cir. 1994).
82 See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 1989).
83 See id. at 529-30.
76
77
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attorneys do rely on no-action letters, possibly to the detriment of
their clients.84
The SEC has revised its regulations with regards to
broker-dealers many times in the recent past, resulting in the
hindrance of small-issuer capital acquisition. The SEC held a
hardline position against unregistered finders from 1993 to 2007,
requiring registration if the broker was actively involved in the
transaction and received transaction-based compensation.85 The
SEC expanded its views in subsequent no-action letters. For
example, a 2008 no-action letter stated that
an intermediary who did nothing more than bring merger or
acquisition-minded people or entities together and did not participate in
negotiations or settlements between them probably would not be a
broker in securities and not subject to the registration requirements of
Section 15 of the Exchange Act; on the other hand, an intermediary who
plays an integral role in negotiating and effecting mergers or
acquisitions that involve transactions in securities generally would be
deemed to be a broker and required to register with the Commission.86

In this letter, the SEC recognized that certain financial
intermediaries may facilitate negotiations for issuers without
registration, as long as they do not engage in activities that pose a
significant risk to investors or issuers.
In 2009, the SEC enhanced its scrutiny of transactionbased compensation by bringing an administrative proceeding
against RAM Capital Resources, LLC and its two principals.87
RAM Capital and its principals had identified and solicited
investors to participate in private investments in public companies
without registering with the SEC as a broker-dealer.88 RAM was
compensated in proportion to the size of the deals and had a hand
in the structure of the offerings.89 The SEC imposed sanctions on
84 See Informal Guidance Program for Small Entities, Exchange Act Release Nos.
33-7407, 34-38446, 35-26695, 39-2349, IC-22587, IA-1624, 17 C.F.R. Part 202, at n.20, 1997
WL 138947 (Mar. 27, 1997) (“The Divisions of Corporation Finance and Market Regulation
specify when others may rely upon the advice in a no-action letter. The Division of
Investment Management generally permits third parties to rely on no-action or interpretive
letters to the extent that the third party’s facts and circumstances are substantially similar
to those described in the underlying request for a no-action or interpretive letter.”); Donna
M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current
Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 946-47 (1998).
85 Mason & Obialo, supra note 26 (citing Hallmark Capital Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter (June 11, 2007); Wirthlin, John R., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 34898 (Jan. 19,
1999); Davenport Mgmt. Inc. et al., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 13, 1993)).
86 See Goppelt, Henry C., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) ¶ 79,814 (May 14, 1974).
87 Ram Capital Res., LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 60149, 2009 WL
1723950 (June 19, 2009).
88 Id.
89 Id.

2016]

BROKER-DEALER LAW REFORM

1219

RAM and its principals pursuant to section 15(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, finding that they “knew or were reckless in not
knowing that Ram’s compensation structure for its services
required RAM to register as a broker-dealer.”90 By “compensation
structure,” the SEC was referring to the fact that RAM was paid
in proportion to the monetary size of the transaction.
Similarly, in 2010, the SEC denied no-action relief to
Nemzoff & Company, LLC, even though the company arguably
fell within a limited exception to broker-dealer registration under
section 3(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Nemzoff, in its
role as a consultant, would not possess securities at any point
during the transaction.91 Section 3(e) provides that charitable
organizations are exempt from broker-dealer registration.92 The
SEC determined that “Nemzoff, as a consultant, would not be a
[q]ualifying [p]erson under Section 3(e)” because Nemzoff did not
preclude the possibility of receiving transaction-based
compensation.93 Therefore, Nemzoff’s 3(e) exemption from
registration was voided on the basis of transaction-based
compensation. Under the provisions outlined in the 2014 M&A
brokers no-action letter,94 Nemzoff would likely be exempt from
the registration requirement, because in its role as a consultant to
the transacting parties, it would not bind the parties to the
transaction, provide financing to a transaction, handle funds or
securities exchanged in connection with the transaction,
organize the groups involved in the M&A transaction, or
transfer interests to a passive buyer.95 The preceding temporal
evolution of SEC policy demonstrates that the SEC does not
possess a static view with regard to interpretation of the brokerdealer registration provisions. Furthermore, the M&A no-action
letter is less valuable to broker-dealers than it may appear at
first glance, because the SEC may revoke it at any time.
The SEC may change its policies for many reasons. The
commissioners are politically appointed officials;96 thus, their
policies may shift as the legislative and executive branches
change. Different political ideologies may favor investor

Id.
Nemzoff & Co., LLC, Denial of SEC No-Action Letter Request, 2010 WL
4914519 (Nov. 30, 2010).
92 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2012).
93 Id.
94 M&A Brokers, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 356983 (Jan. 31, 2014).
95 See id. at *2-3.
96 Current SEC Commissioners, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner.
shtml#.VK2zASvF_g0 [http://perma.cc/VRW2-WXJU] (last visited May 30, 2016).
90
91
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protection over the regulation of brokerage activities.97 But
stability and growth in the economy require definitive capital
acquisition regulations that persevere through political
changeover. This can be achieved more effectively through a
comprehensive legislative solution.
Although the M&A no-action letter represents a favorable
change in SEC enforcement policy towards unregistered brokers
who transfer control of a company, it has no impact on brokers
who effect transfers of less than full control. It is not in the
business plan of many small businesses to cede control, especially
early in the venture. Many entrepreneurs would rather sell their
business concept instead of accepting loss of control over the
evolution of the company.98 If the owner sells the idea, the owner
will realize a definite economic return; however, if the owner sells
control of the company, the owner cannot be sure that new
management will successfully market and develop the idea or
product.99 Thus, although the M&A no-action letter shows that
the SEC is cognizant of the realities of the private equity market,
the current broker-dealer rules are insufficient to ameliorate the
difficulties presented to small businesses seeking capital. More
robust changes in regulation are necessary in order to allow
unregistered financial intermediaries to effect transactions
without transferring control of the business.
B.

Consequences of Violating Broker-Dealer Registration
Requirements

If the SEC chooses to categorize an unregistered broker as
a broker-dealer under the 1934 Act, the unregistered broker will
be unable to legally collect unpaid fees from principals.100 Section
78cc(b) of the Exchange Act renders void sales of securities made
in violation of the Exchange Act. Therefore, any investor that
purchases securities from an unregistered financial intermediary
acting as a broker-dealer may have the right to void the
transaction and claim that the funds used to purchase the
securities must be returned.101 Furthermore, if a company uses an
97 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and
Interest Group Politics, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 939 (2010) (arguing that political forces
directly affect levels of investor protection).
98 James S. Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969
DUKE L.J. 273, 282 (1969).
99 See id.
100 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (2012); Martino &
Canales, supra note 27.
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc; Martino & Canales, supra note 27.
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unregistered broker, the company stands to lose its exemption
from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.102
It may lose an important avenue for raising capital because the
SEC may restrict the company from engaging in private
placement offerings.103 This consequence is significant because
most small-issuer offerings rely on SEC exemptions, as smaller
issuers cannot yet afford a fully registered offering. The SEC can
seek an injunction against “the finder activities, issue a ceaseand-desist order following notice and a hearing,” and in an
unlikely state of affairs, “refer the matter to the government for
criminal prosecution.”104 The SEC can also impose civil penalties
and require accounting and disgorgement.105
One of the consequences for small businesses that engage
unregistered brokers is the possibility that transactions may be
rescinded if the SEC determines that the broker should have been
registered prior to facilitating the transaction.106 The rescission of
a securities transaction can lead to the financial ruin of small
businesses. In 2012, Neogenix Oncology, Inc. filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy because the SEC found that securities transactions
assisted by unregistered financial intermediaries were voidable,
and the company was unable to continue raising capital.107 As a
102 For example, in a Regulation D transaction, an issuer may be liable for the
general solicitation conducted by an unregistered broker, leading to loss of the exemption
and liability for the sale of unregistered securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (exempting
offerings by an issuer “not involving any public offering”); SEC Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.502(c) (2013) (prohibiting public advertising and general solicitation to investors in all
Regulation D transactions, except for transactions under Rule 504 or 506(c)).
103 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) (2013) (prohibiting “bad actor[s]” from
engaging in Regulation D exempt offerings); Martino & Canales, supra note 27.
104 Martino & Canales, supra note 27; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2012).
105 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)-(e).
106 The Securities Exchange Act provides in pertinent part that

[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a
security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in
violation of, any provision of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall
be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual
knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such
contract was in violation of any such provision, rule or regulation . . . .
Id. § 78cc(b).
107 See Neogenix Letter, supra note 2; see also Alexander J. Davie, Neogenix
Oncology: A Good Case Study on Securities Law (Non)Compliance by a High Growth
Company—Part 1: How It All Happened, STRICTLY BUS. (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://www.strictlybusinesslawblog.com/2012/10/05/neogenix-oncology-a-good-case-studyon-securities-law-noncompliance-by-a-high-growth-company-part-1-how-it-all-happened/
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result, Neogenix was forced to sell all of its assets to a single
bidder, effectively dissolving the company. A legislative solution is
necessary to remedy this defect in the rules governing financial
intermediaries in order to allow small businesses to efficiently
and effectively raise capital.
C.

State Blue Sky Laws

Even though the M&A brokers no-action letter provides
limited relief to M&A brokers from federal enforcement of
registration laws, states continue to impose registration
requirements on unregistered financial intermediaries.108 State
securities laws, often coined “blue sky laws,”109 impose expensive
and cumbersome registration requirements on intermediaries
who are not registered with the federal government. Blue sky
laws are not preempted by federal law as it now stands.110 Blue
sky laws have been enacted in virtually every state, and while
they differ in their details, their overriding purpose is to protect
investors from fraud and market manipulation.111
State blue sky laws are modeled on the Uniform Securities
Act of 2002, the goal of which was to standardize state securities
laws.112 Blue sky laws generally require registration of securities
offerings and financial intermediaries for the purpose of
protecting investors.113 One advantage of having a uniform act is
that courts can defer to the interpretations of courts in other
states on unresolved questions of law.114 The California Act, for
[http://perma.cc/Q83A-Z6W6] (“These ‘finders’ fees’ were payments Neogenix made to
third parties for their role in raising over $30 million in capital for Neogenix.”).
108 See B. Rogers, Blue Sky Laws, 87 A.L.R. 42 (1933).
109 While the exact origin of the name is unclear, the first known use was by
Justice McKenna in Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-51 (1917) (“The name that
is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed; that is, to use the language of a
cited case, ‘speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of “blue sky”’;
or, as stated by counsel in another case, ‘to stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns,
visionary oil wells, distant gold mines and other like fraudulent exploitations.’ Even if the
descriptions be regarded as rhetorical, the existence of evil is indicated, and a belief of its
detriment; and we shall not pause to do more than state that the prevention of deception is
within the competency of government and that the appreciation of the consequences of it is
not open for our review.” (quoting Trading Stamp Cases, 240 U.S. 342, 391 (1916))).
110 See Campbell, supra note 79, at 567.
111 See Rogers, supra note 108.
112 See CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE, supra note 78; see also Adam J. Gana &
Michael Villacres, Blue Skies for America in the Securities Industry . . . Except for New
York: New York’s Martin Act and the Private Right of Action, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 587, 590-91 (2014).
113 See, e.g., Gill Printing Co. v. Goodman, 139 So. 250, 254 (1932) (“The
registration of stock for sale under the Blue Sky Law is not a revenue measure, but is a
regulation to protect the investing public.”).
114 Gana & Villacres, supra note 112, at 591.
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instance, defines a “broker” as any person who effects
“transactions in securities . . . for the account of others or for his
own account.”115 Blue sky laws require most sellers of securities to
obtain a license.116 A license is granted pursuant to an inquiry into
the applicant and the nature of the securities that the applicant
plans to sell.117 Since state blue sky laws share with federal law a
common purpose of full disclosure and investor protection, there
are overlapping regulations. Such regulations are unnecessary
and detrimental to the efficient functioning of securities markets
because registrants must pay registration fees and comply with
separate disclosure requirements at both the federal and state
levels, thereby dissuading registered broker-dealers from
participating in smaller transactions. Although many assert that
state securities laws are an outgrowth of efforts to prevent fraud
and manipulation, others argue that the statutes were passed in
large part due to special interest lobbying.118
In recognition of the significant impediment that blue sky
laws pose to early-stage capital acquisition, the North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)119 has submitted
for comment a uniform state model rule regarding the exemption
of certain M&A brokers from registration as broker-dealers.120
The model rule mirrors the provisions of the M&A brokers noaction letter121 and exempts financial intermediaries from state
registration as long as they limit their activities to the transfer of
control of a privately held company without possessing securities
or funds at any point in the process.122
Like the SEC, most states currently do not recognize the
difference between a finder and a broker-dealer. Michigan is the
only state that allows separate registration for finders.123
Michigan requires unregistered broker-dealers to register as
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25004 (West 2005).
Rogers, supra note 108.
117 Id.
118 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70
TEX. L. REV. 347, 348-51 (1991).
119 The NASAA is an organization dedicated to promulgating uniform
securities laws, protecting investors, and guiding SEC and SRO rulemaking processes.
See About Us, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/ [http://perma.cc/T337-V63Y]
(last visited May 30, 2016).
120 See NASAA, NASAA MODEL RULE EXEMPTING CERTAIN MERGER AND
ACQUISITION BROKERS FROM STATE REGISTRATION (2015), http://www.nasaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Second-Request-for-Comments-MA-Broker-Model-Rule-FINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GSM6-GYHY] [hereinafter NASAA MODEL RULE].
121 See M&A Brokers, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 356983, at *2-3 (Jan.
31, 2014).
122 See NASAA MODEL RULE, supra note 120, at 2.
123 See Michigan Uniform Securities Act, 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 247.
115

116
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investment advisers.124 The statute allows these finders,
registered as investment advisers, to perform tasks typical of
intermediary brokers, including the introduction of issuers to
investors and the delivery of offering materials.125
Blue sky laws can prohibitively restrict entrepreneurial
activities, resulting in the sale or abandonment of existing
small businesses, rather than development and growth.126
Six state statutes contain voidability provisions, all of which specifically
give a right of rescission to the buyer. Four states make any sale made
in violation of any provision of the Blue Sky statutes voidable. “Arizona
limits its voidability provision to the sale of unregistered securities,
transactions by unregistered dealers, or specified fraudulent practices;
Florida and Illinois extend rescission to violation of the securities dealer,
associated person, and investment adviser registration provisions.”127

California provides rescission rights, attorneys’ fees, and
damages to persons who transact with an unregistered brokerdealer.128 Although individual states’ blue sky laws vary widely,
generally the registration requirements are redundant against
the backdrop of federal securities regulation, and they inhibit
small business growth while simultaneously affording minimum
additional protections to investors.
D.

Consequences of the Current Regulatory Framework

Brokerage firms are willing to provide registered brokerdealers for larger transactions but are wary of smaller deals
because of “self-imposed thresholds.”129 Registered broker-dealers
are averse to dealing with smaller issuers for many reasons,
including the fact that compliance costs for small and large
transactions are often the same, and the cost of transacting for
smaller issuers is likely greater than for larger issuers because
larger issuers are more experienced with such transactions.130
Additionally, the SEC frequently changes its standards regarding
broker-dealer registration, as it is not precedentially bound by its
no-action letters. This creates unpredictability for registered

See id.
See id.
126 See Mofsky, supra note 98, at 283-90.
127 ABA Report, supra note 16, at 1004-05 (footnotes omitted) (quoting LOUIS
LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 11-B-4 (3d ed., 2001)).
128 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25501.5 (West 2015).
129 ABA Report, supra note 16, at 968.
130 Id. at 968-69.
124
125
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broker-dealers and increases transaction costs.131 The multibilliondollar private equity industry cannot depend on uncertain doctrine.
The consequences of violating broker-dealer registration
requirements are dire and can lead to the dissolution or
bankruptcy of a business, as demonstrated by the Neogenix
case.132 Blue sky laws add further complications, creating an
overlapping layer of regulation that stifles capital acquisition,
especially for smaller issuers.
Congress has yet to respond to the problems created by
the lack of a cohesive legal framework to regulate brokers’ actual
practices. The law is asynchronous with current capital-raising
practices because small businesses across the United States
utilize unregistered brokers to facilitate private transactions of
equity securities.133 Although the SEC has declined to prosecute in
some cases due to its recognition that unregistered financial
intermediaries are a necessary tool for small-issuer capital
acquisition, a literal reading of the Act reveals that these
unregistered brokers are technically in violation of both federal
law and many state laws.134
Registration as a broker-dealer is disproportionately
expensive in comparison to the expected gain for brokers who
facilitate sales of securities for early-stage businesses. The
application fee for NASD membership for a broker-dealer is
$3,000, consultants will charge $5,000 for aid with the application
process, and experienced legal counsel is usually expensive.135 The
initial legal, compliance, and accounting costs of NASD
membership often exceed $150,000, and annual maintenance
costs range between $75,000 and $100,000 per year.136 Cost,
however, is only one of the disproportionate aspects of the current
regulatory framework. The current application for broker-dealer
131 See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254,
257 (2d Cir. 1994); see also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
132 See discussion of Neogenix Oncology, supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
133 See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 970 (referring to anecdotal evidence of
unregistered broker-dealer activity from a “large number of attorneys”).
134 See id. at 960 (“Notwithstanding the various labels, and despite the fact
that a great number of the brokers, funded businesses, and even sometimes their
attorneys, do not realize that they are operating in violation of securities laws; simply
put, they are unlicensed securities brokers whose fee contracts are unenforceable and
whose activities are, in fact, illegal.”).
135 ABA Report, supra note 16, at 1011; see also Compliance Guide, supra note
15 (“Most ‘brokers’ and ‘dealers’ must register with the SEC and join a ‘self-regulatory
organization,’ or SRO.”).
136 ABA Business Law Section, Comment Letter on FINRA Regulatory Notice
14-09 Proposing Rules for Limited Corporate Financing Brokers (May 21, 2014),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeComment/p512735.pdf [http://perma.cc/
JK6X-LL2L].
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registration is needlessly complex for small-issuer transactions.137
The educational requirements for broker-dealer registration are
misaligned with the reality of small-issuer intermediary broker
practice.138 These arduous registration and “compliance
requirements effectively limit the [registered] broker to large
transactions that yield a substantial return.”139 Since the
functions that many brokers perform are limited to introductions,
buyer formation, and facilitation of negotiations, the current
regulations imposing stringent recordkeeping and financial
responsibility requirements are unnecessary to ensure that
investors are protected.140
III.

A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

A legislative solution is needed to ameliorate the lack of
synchronization between the actual practices of intermediary
brokers and the law as it now stands. First, Congress should
codify the provisions of the M&A broker no-action letter141
pertaining to the sale of control of companies in order to protect
issuers and brokers who transfer control of privately held
corporations from a change in SEC enforcement policies. Second,
Congress should amend the Securities Exchange Act to create a
separate class of registered broker-dealers (intermediary brokers)
who may assist early-stage issuers with capital acquisition.
Under this regulatory framework, intermediary brokers should be
permitted to engage in a limited range of activities without
risking reprisal from the SEC, including (1) receiving transactionbased compensation, (2) introducing potential investors to
potential issuers, (3) engaging investors in private placement
offers, and (4) initiating negotiations between parties, even if the
issuer does not plan to cede control of the company. This proposed
legislation would further contribute to the growth of the U.S.
economy by providing smaller businesses with a more equitable
route to capital acquisition.

137 See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 1010 (“The present broker-dealer
registration system, and especially the NASD membership application process, are
disproportionately complex for someone acting only as a ‘finder’ or one who is locating
companies as potential merger candidates.”).
138 See id. at 1011-12 (discussing the various types of preregistration
examinations that broker-dealers are required to pass, and suggesting a new set of
examinations to cover topics more congruent to intermediary brokers’ actual practices).
139 Samuel Hagreen, Note, The JOBS Act: Exempting Internet Portals from the
Definition of Broker-Dealer, 90 DENVER U. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 75 (2013).
140 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 to -5, -11 (2013).
141 M&A Brokers, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 356983 (Jan. 31, 2014).
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Policy Considerations

Congress has already enacted statutes that aim to achieve
the same goal as the statute proposed in this note. The JOBS
Act,142 which Congress passed in 2012, was calculated to remove
the legal barriers preventing startup businesses from advertising
to investors and selling securities on the public market.143 The
JOBS Act removed such barriers by lessening restrictions on
emerging-growth companies, allowing companies to raise capital
over the Internet from ordinary investors, and revising archaic
SEC regulations.144 The Act allows smaller issuers to sell securities
to the public and in ways previously limited to larger issuers
through registered offerings.145 Further, the Act permits
crowdfunding, a process in which ordinary investors can invest in
early-stage companies through online crowdfunding portals.146 In
addition, Title II of the JOBS Act specifically exempted online
crowdfunding portals from broker-dealer registration.147 This
exemption was motivated by the perceived need for increased
public access to investment opportunities and small-issuer access
to capital.148
The limited exemption to broker-dealer registration for
Title II transactions recognized that the current regulatory
scheme actually hinders the financing of small issuers more
than it protects investors.149 The exemption was adopted nearly
unanimously, as its provisions were recognized to benefit earlystage businesses and reduce significant costs to investors.150
The JOBS Act demonstrates that Congress and the executive
branch recognize the problems that small issuers face in
raising capital and have already taken significant steps to
ameliorate the issue. Codification of the provisions of the M&A
no-action letter and enactment of a statute specifying a
separate registration vehicle for intermediary brokers would
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
See JAMES HAMILTON, WOLTERS KLUWER LAW & BUS., GUIDANCE AND
COMMENTS INFORM JOBS ACT IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2012), http://news.wolterskluwerlb.com/
media/Briefing_Jobs-Act_May_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/UR8G-35WX].
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act: Frequently Asked Questions About
the Exemption from Broker-Dealer Registration in Title II of the JOBS Act, SEC (Feb. 5,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/exemption-broker-dealer-registration-jobsact-faq.htm [http://perma.cc/RDK2-Q6LU].
148 See id.
149 See Hagreen, supra note 139, at 77-78.
150 Id.
142

143
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continue to expedite the same policy goal that drove the JOBS
Act—stimulating the growth of business through new avenues
for capital formation.
B.

Elements of the Proposed Legislation
1. Registration Requirements for Intermediary Brokers

The current registration system for broker-dealers
requires maintenance of a minimum net capital equal to the
monetary value of the securities transactions the broker-dealer
conducts and to its financial ratios.151 This requirement aims to
ensure that a broker-dealer always has enough liquid assets to
promptly satisfy the claims of customers.152 Since broker-dealers
typically hold customer funds or securities at certain points in
transactions, the net capital requirement ensures that investors
and issuers are insured against any loss of such funds or
securities. On the other hand, intermediary brokers will not be
permitted to handle funds or securities on behalf of any principal
at any point during the transaction. Since intermediary brokers
primarily engage in introducing parties, organizing groups, and
facilitating negotiations, there is no need for a net capital
requirement pursuant to intermediary broker registration,
because there is no commensurate risk of loss.
2. Transaction-Based Compensation
The SEC has argued that unregistered brokers “edge
closer” to becoming full-fledged broker-dealers when they receive
transaction-based compensation.153 In the SEC’s view,
intermediaries who have a financial motivation in proportion to
the size of the transaction are more likely to commit acts
inconsistent with investors’ best interests.154 However,
recommending an investment strategy or leading negotiations
between investors and issuers are not necessarily brokerage
activities, because other professionals engage in such enterprises.155
See Compliance Guide, supra note 15.
See id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining the
concept of equitable solvency).
153 ABA Report, supra note 16, at 974.
154 See Herbruck, Alder & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1290291, at *2
(May 3, 2002).
155 SEC v. Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1334-35 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (criticizing
the SEC’s dependence on transaction-based compensation as the singularly sufficient
element of broker-dealer activity). Likewise, the practical outcome of a flat-fee
compensation model as opposed to a transaction-based compensation model will lead to
151

152
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Allowing an intermediary broker to be compensated in proportion
to the size of the transaction at issue will lead to positive outcomes,
including proper competition between intermediary brokers,
market selection, and enhanced value for transaction
participants.156 The market will choose the most efficient outcome,
because investors and issuers both aim to reduce transaction
costs while effecting their equity investments.157 Full disclosure
and fraudulent misrepresentation rules will protect investors
while allowing intermediary brokers to compete for the most
valuable transactions.158 Market competition will lead to
enhanced value for issuers because intermediary brokers will
have a direct financial incentive to perform.
3. Engaging Investors and Initiating Negotiations
Intermediary brokers must be permitted to engage
investors and initiate negotiations in private placement offers
because the function of an intermediary broker is to serve as the
salesman for the company and the driving force behind the
transaction. Without the legal ability to engage potential
investors and consult with them on the details of the proposed
transaction, an intermediary broker would be essentially useless
except as a repository of information for inquirers. Proponents of
the same result, because the market will adjust to accommodate the skills and
expertise of particular brokers. Brokers with more experience and demonstrably better
skills will have higher flat fees and will tend to facilitate larger deals for greater
compensation. Brokers with less experience and fewer skills will tend to facilitate
smaller deals, because presumably, larger corporate actors will prefer the broker with
more experience and skill. Thus, although a fee may be labeled a flat fee, brokers will
still be compensated commensurate to the size of the transaction.
156 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549-50 (1984).
157 Id.
Of all recent developments in financial economics, the efficient capital market
hypothesis (“ECMH”) has achieved the widest acceptance by the legal culture. It
now commonly informs the academic literature on a variety of topics; it is
addressed by major law school casebooks and textbooks on business law; it
structures debate over the future of securities regulation both within and without
the Securities and Exchange Commission; it has served as the intellectual
premise for a major revision of the disclosure system administered by the
Commission; and it has even begun to influence judicial decisions and the actual
practice of law. In short, the ECMH is now the context in which serious discussion
of the regulation of financial markets takes place.
Id. (citations omitted).
158 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977) (“Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act makes it ‘unlawful for any person . . . to use or employ . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of [SEC rules]’; Rule 10b-5, promulgated by
the SEC under § 10(b), prohibits, in addition to nondisclosure and misrepresentation, any
‘artifice to defraud’ or any act ‘which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.’”).
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the current registration system may assert that it aids in the
prevention of fraud; however, full disclosure requirements159 will
continue to protect investors who already have the right to bring a
direct claim against brokers in the event of fraudulent
misrepresentation.160 Under the new statutory framework,
intermediary brokers may have a duty to disclose relevant
information to the investors upon request. The burden of full
disclosure, however, should remain on the issuer because the
issuer has direct access to relevant company information. Since
the role of an intermediary broker is essentially to engage
investors and facilitate negotiations, individual issuers are in a
stronger position to handle the details of the transaction,
including disclosure of all relevant prospectuses.
The SEC currently views the practice of engaging investors
and facilitating negotiations as indicative of registered brokerdealer activity.161 The SEC’s position is that the Internet has
created opportunities for financial intermediaries to reach millions
of individuals, and such communications must be regulated when
they relate to the sale of securities.162 In light of these
developments, the SEC no longer believes that brokers that engage
investors and initiate negotiations are exempt from broker-dealer
registration.163 For example, in the denial of no-action relief to C &
W Portfolio Management, Inc., C & W provided
services as an intermediary, effecting repurchase transactions
between primary dealers involving Treasury notes, bills, and bonds. C
& W act[ed] as an intermediary until both principals to the transaction
[we]re in agreement as to the rate, amount, and terms of the

159 For example, in Regulation D offerings, issuers and broker-dealers must
provide investors with disclosure documents that are generally the same as those used
in registered offerings. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2013), with Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012) (listing information required in registration statement for
a registered offering).
160 See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(holding that section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 creates an implied
right of action, allowing civil suits by persons injured as a result of a violation of the
rule); see also In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d, 494
F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974) (observing that Rule 10b-5 was designed “to protect purity of
the process of buying and selling securities and to insure that investors [would] receive
full disclosure of the information they need if they are intelligently to make significant
investment decisions”).
161 See, e.g., SEC v. Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d 268, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
162 See Dominion Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 669838, at *2
(Mar. 7, 2000).
163 Id.
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transaction. Once agreement [w]as . . . reached, C & W disclose[d] the
identities of the principals.164

The exchange of funds was always arranged by the principals, not
C & W.165 The principals to each transaction issued confirmations
to each other after C & W withdrew from the negotiations.166 C &
W received a set fee, not transaction-based compensation, and
notified both principals of the fee that it received.167 It then
requested assurance from the SEC Division of Market Regulation
that it would not recommend enforcement action.168 The Division
denied no-action relief, presumably on the basis of C & W’s
engagement of principals and facilitation of negotiations, since
other indicative factors of registered broker-dealer activity were
not present.169 The partial denial of no-action relief to C & W
demonstrates the SEC’s current strict approach to unregistered
brokers who merely engage investors and facilitate negotiations.
Permitting intermediary brokers to engage investors and
initiate negotiations is vital to the capital acquisition function.
The SEC seems to suggest that as a result of “technological
advances,” worldwide communication capacity, and digital
networking capabilities, unregistered brokers should be precluded
from facilitating the negotiation process.170 Conceding that the
Internet has changed the way the world does business and
enabled faster and more efficient communication between issuers
and investors, the SEC’s conclusion that unregistered brokers
should be further restricted as a result does not follow. Issuers
and investors still need the services of brokers to effectuate
transactions, as demonstrated by the continued market demand
for brokers’ services.171 Furthermore, the SEC’s explanation does
not address the core purpose of the registration requirement:
protecting investors and ensuring continued market viability

164 C & W Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 258821, at *1
(July 20, 1989).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. Although C & W was not an employee of the issuer, it received a flat fee
for the transaction, and there was no indication that it had ever sold securities for the
issuer before or provided advice or valuation as to the merit of the investment. The
Division’s response did not specifically explain its reasoning for denying no-action
relief, but such reasoning can be inferred. Id.
170 Dominion Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 669838, at *2 (Mar.
7, 2000).
171 See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 959 (addressing the “vast and pervasive
‘gray market’ of brokerage activity”).
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through full disclosure and accountability measures.172 If the
Internet and enhanced technology were sufficient to fill the void
between issuers and investors, then there would not be a market
for unregistered brokers. Thus, the benefits of allowing
intermediary brokers to engage investors and initiate negotiations
are substantial, and allowing them to do so is an essential aspect
of the proposed legislation.
4. Handling Funds or Securities Exchanged in the
Transaction
Currently, section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act provides
that, with certain exceptions, a broker-dealer may not allow its
aggregate indebtedness to surpass 2,000% of net capital, and
the broker-dealer must maintain a minimum net capital of
$25,000.173 The aggregate indebtedness to capital ratio and the
minimum net capital requirement are cumulative and are not
alternative requirements, and both must be met.174 The purpose
underlying these rules is to ensure broker-dealer liquidity in
the event of fraud or misappropriation of funds.175
Due to the limited nature of the intermediary broker’s role
in the transaction, there is no need for the intermediary broker to
handle funds or securities. An intermediary broker may engage
the parties, form groups of buyers, inform the buyers about the
issuer’s securities, and perform other integral tasks to expedite
the transaction. If parties want an intermediary to handle funds
or securities, they may set up an escrow account, engage a fully
registered broker-dealer, or obtain alternative financing
arrangements. Precluding intermediary brokers from handling
funds or securities helps to ensure that investors are protected
from potentially manipulative practices and conflicts of interest
and further justifies eliminating the net capital requirements for
the new class of intermediary brokers.
5. SEC and SRO Examinations
Current broker-dealer registration requires the registrant
to complete Form BD, a lengthy form that should be modified to
172 See Orudjev, supra note 33 (“Compliance with such requirements is an
increasingly costly and time-intensive proposition, but the underlying purpose for the complex
fabric of regulations for all broker-dealer activities is to protect the investing public.”).
173 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c 3-1(a)(1) (2011).
174 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 8024, Jan. 18, 1967, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72129.
175 See id.
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fit the more limited activities of intermediary brokers.176 The main
purpose of Form BD is to permit the SEC to determine whether
the applicant is eligible to provide full broker-dealer services.177
Under current regulations, broker-dealers must register with a
self-regulatory organization (SRO), typically FINRA.178 As part of
the registration process, brokers must pass the Series 7, Series
24, and Series 27 exams,179 which evaluate the fitness of brokerdealer applicants to provide full broker-dealer services.180 Under
the proposed legislation, intermediary brokers must still register
with an SRO; however, the examination requirements would be
modified commensurate with the notion that intermediary
brokers will not handle funds or securities during the transaction.
SEC and SRO examiners should be required to investigate the
financial details of transactions in which the intermediary broker
has participated in order to determine if the broker has violated
the prohibition on handling funds or securities for the principals.
The scope of investigations should be reduced to more
appropriately suit the limited activities in which intermediary
brokers actually engage.
6. Preemption of State Blue Sky Laws
Pursuant to
the
National
Securities
Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, registered broker-dealers are not
subject to state law requirements that differ from those under the
U.S. Code.181 The Act preempted state broker-dealer registration
laws for the purpose of regulatory simplification and investor
protection.182 Similarly, states should be curtailed from regulating
the new class of intermediary brokers in order to lower barriers to
176 SEC Form BD, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formbd.pdf [http://perma.cc/
K53P-YQKV] (last visited Apr. 25, 2016); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(7) (2012).
177 See SEC Form BD, supra note 176.
178 See Compliance Guide, supra note 15.
179 See Series 7—General Securities Representative Examination (GS), FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/industry/compliance/registration/qualificationsexams/qualifications/p0
11051 [http://perma.cc/6VEH-9VG8] (last visited May 30, 2016); Series 24—General
Securities Principal Examination (GP), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/series24
#sthash.SKxKeRoG.dpuf [http://perma.cc/4APA-G55P] (last visited May 30, 2016); Series
27—Financial and Operations Principal Exam (FN), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/
series27#sthash.aIhcYkgE.dpuf [http://perma.cc/5PQD-86TM] (last visited May 30, 2016).
180 See Series 7, supra note 179; Series 24, supra note 179; Series 27, supra
note 179.
181 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, § 103 Pub. L. 104290, 110 Stat 3416.
182 See Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S.
Senate, 1996 WL 302811 (1996).
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entry to the field. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that
state law must be preempted if Congress has “occup[ied] a given
field” of legislation or if state laws “stand[] as an obstacle” to a
congressional objective.183 Additional state restrictions on
intermediary broker registration and activity would hinder the
objective of this legislation: to create a new, viable path for smallissuer capital acquisition.
Blue sky laws are a substantial impediment to
intermediary broker activity because they impose additional
registration requirements. In fact, most state securities
regulations of broker-dealers merely duplicate the prohibitions
of the federal securities laws and therefore add no additional
protection for investors.184 As applied to intermediary brokers,
the marginal protections conferred by blue sky laws are
outweighed by the costs. Since state securities laws, like
federal law, generally only recognize one class of brokerdealer,185 the same problems inherent in the current federal
scheme are present in blue sky laws. Preemption of state
securities laws pertaining to broker-dealers will eliminate
unnecessary overlap and additional impediments to
intermediary broker activity.
Federal securities laws will provide investors with full
disclosure, and any disclosure provided by state securities laws
will be unnecessarily duplicative.186 In addition, the 1934
Securities Exchange Act provides that “it shall be unlawful . . . to
use . . . any manipulative or deceptive device” in the sale of
securities.187 Furthermore, the 1933 Securities Exchange Act
provides a private right of action against “any person who . . . sells
a security” and makes “an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made.”188 Although some minimum framework of blue sky
See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
See Campbell, supra note 79, at 553-54 (arguing that state administrators
have an entrenchment motive and thus will not repeal blue sky laws regardless of their
detrimental effects). “Today, blue sky laws are ineffective, philosophically unsound,
and unnecessarily expensive, and they should be substantially eliminated. Because of
the vested interests that have developed, however, it is unlikely that states will
respond to this problem, and it will probably take action by the United States Congress
to preempt the area.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
185 Rogers, supra note 108.
186 Campbell, supra note 79, at 558 (“[E]ven assuming the appropriateness of
mandated disclosure, the present state requirements regarding disclosure are indefensible.
The reason is, quite simply, that the federal disclosure requirements are sufficient, and, as a
result, there is no need to impose additional registration requirements at the state level.”).
187 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
188 Id. § 77l(a).
183

184
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laws should be maintained to regulate strictly intrastate
transactions, which are rare in light of modern markets that cross
state and national borders,189 federal preemption of blue sky laws
would allow intermediary brokers to effect transactions for
smaller issuers without the enormous costs imposed by such laws.
CONCLUSION
The current state of federal securities laws regulating
broker-dealers poses many problems for small businesses aspiring
to raise capital through the assistance of a broker-dealer. A literal
reading of section 78o(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act would
seem to require all financial intermediaries in securities
transactions to register as broker-dealers, even if they only
engage in a single transaction.190 Recognizing that the burdens
imposed on registered broker-dealers make this regulatory
framework highly undesirable, the SEC and the courts have
diverged from a literal reading of the Act. The courts apply a
multifactor test to determine if intermediaries must register as
broker-dealers,191 while the SEC tends to focus on specific factors,
often declaring that the receipt of transaction-based compensation
is in itself sufficient to require registration.192 Recognizing that
the regulatory framework in place prevents efficient capital
acquisition for many small issuers, the SEC revised its
enforcement policy by stating in a no-action letter that it would
not recommend enforcement, subject to many limiting conditions,
against an M&A broker that transferred control of a business in a
private transaction.193 While providing some relief, this no-action
letter is insufficient to ameliorate the tension between the actual
practices of securities market professionals and the law as it
stands. The lack of precedential effect of the M&A brokers noaction letter, the SEC’s history of changing its policies, and the
inapplicability of the letter’s provisions to intermediaries who do
not transfer control of a company, but merely sell equity securities

189 The intrastate exemption specified in 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j maintains the constitutionality of the statute, and while not the main focus of this
note, it is safe to assume that nearly all securities transactions must comply with
federal disclosure requirements.
190 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
191 See supra Section I.A.
192 See, e.g., Herbruck, Alder & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1290291,
at *2 (June 4, 2002).
193 See M&A Brokers, SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 356983, at *1 (Jan. 31, 2014).
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has left the law pertaining to financial intermediaries for smallissuer transactions in limbo.
This note proposes a legislative solution as a viable path to
capital for small issuers while maintaining the integrity of
markets and investor protections. Similar to the JOBS Act, the
proposed legislation would relax regulations and registration
requirements for brokers that engage in certain limited activities.
The specific provisions of the proposed legislation outlined here are
flexible and provide maximum maneuverability for intermediary
brokers while carefully avoiding enabling greater incidents of
fraud and misrepresentation in transactions. Without this or
similar legislation that advances the same policy goals, brokerdealer rules will remain in a state of uncertainty to the detriment
of smaller issuers and unregistered financial intermediaries alike.
Alexander R. Tiktin†

† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2016; B.S., John Jay College, 2013.
Thank you to Lillian Smith, Michael Piacentini, Nina Vershuta, and the entire staff of
the Brooklyn Law Review for all of their hard work on this note. I would also like to
thank Professor James Fanto, Ariela Moskowitz, and Peter Pottier for their brilliant
guidance. Finally, I would like to extend a special thanks to my family for their loving
and limitless support.

